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Abstract: The European Council’s decisions to implement the De 
Larosiere recommendations for a reformed approach to micro-level 
financial supervision and a new European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) are to be welcomed. The ECB’s central role in the ESRB is 
also to be welcomed. However, the limited role envisaged for the 
ESRB means that it may not actually help much in preventing future 
crises. The ESRB should be given a central role in the 
implementation of counter-cyclical capital ratios and in promoting 
(and then overseeing implementation of) other changes such as 
maximum leverage ratios and limits on non-core funding. 
 
                                                 
1 This is a briefing paper delivered by the author in his role as a member of an Expert Panel of advisors to 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs in relation to its Monetary 
Dialogue with the European Central Bank. 1. The EU COUNCIL’S RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The Council of the European Union has agreed with the recommendations of 
the De Larosiere report that Europe’s financial regulatory framework should 
be enhanced by the establishment of a new macro-prudential body (the 
European Systemic Risk Board) and by the establishment of a new European 
System of Financial Supervisors which will be enhanced and better 
resourced versions of the existing Level 3 Committees. 
 
The Council’s recommendations envisage a central role for the ECB in the 
new Systemic Risk Board, with the President of the ECB chairing the Board 
and ECB staff providing the analytical and logistical support. In contrast, no 
direct role is envisaged for the ECB in the new micro-prudential structures. 
 
While I am happy to endorse the recommended role of the ECB in the 
proposed Systemic Risk Board, and will discuss the issue of macro-
prudential regulation in further detail below, I have more mixed attitude in 
relation to its exclusion from the new micro-prudential system.   
 
Moreover, I suspect that expectations for the new macro-prudential body 
may be too high. Analysis of various past Financial Stability reports 
suggests that the type of macro-prudential analysis envisaged for the ESRB 
may do little to prevent the recurrence of financial crises. A more fruitful 
approach may be to augment the new institutional structures with clear and 
transparent financial regulations aimed at making the system more robust. 
 
 2. The ECB and Micro-Prudential Supervision 
 
2.1 Central Banking and Micro-Supervision: General 
Considerations 
 
Section 171 of the De Larosiere report lists various arguments for excluding 
the ECB from a formal role in micro-prudential supervision. The first 
argument listed is that the addition of micro-supervisory duties may impinge 
on the ECB’s fundamental mandate for price stability. I do not agree with 
this argument. In contrast, I would agree with the assessment of Guilermo de 
le Dehesa (2009) that the current financial crisis has provided a lot of 
reasons to favour a regulatory structure in which the monetary policy and 
financial supervision are undertaken under the same roof. 
 
There are a number of reasons to favour an integrated approach to monetary 
policy and financial supervision Firstly, given the crucial role that financial 
institutions play in the macroeconomy, it is essential that central banks have 
as much information as possible about the health of these institutions as well 
as any potential frailties and instabilities. Such information---which can be 
provided as a natural byproduct of the central bank taking a lead role in 
financial supervision---should enhance rather than weaken a central bank’s 
performance in relation to monitoring the economy and implementing its 
mandate for price stability.  
 
Secondly, the current crisis has established again the crucial role that central 
banks play in maintaining financial stability via their role as lender of last 
resort. The integration of central banking with financial supervision allows for interventions to provide assistance to troubled financial institutions to 
done in as efficient a manner as possible. In contrast, examples such as the 
Northern Rock situation have shown how the separation of central bank and 




2.2 The ECB and Micro-Prudential Supervision 
 
Of course, these are general considerations. In reality, any recommendation 
for a role for the ECB in relation to prudential supervision must start from 
the current institutional setup and these realities argue against introducing a 
direct role for the ECB at this point for a couple of reasons. 
 
First, there is the fact that current supervisory frameworks vary significantly 
across the Eurosystem, with some countries adopting the traditional 
integrated model, while others using independent financial regulators. 
Without an involvement of all of its constituent central banks in micro-
prudential supervision, it is hard to countenance a direct role for the ECB in 
this process. 
 
Second, there is the question of the fiscal costs associated with financial 
crisis. The crisis has demonstrated that the European Union’s current agreed 
procedures for dealing with financial crises (as outlined in the Memorandum 
of Understanding) are completely inadequate. The result has been a 
sequence of ad hoc interventions, the scale and nature of which have varied 
widely across countries, with governments directing their fiscal support almost completely on their own domestic banks. These interventions have 
set a series of very dangerous precedents and taxpayers across Europe are 
now aware that they are likely to suffer the costs associated with failures of 
their domestic banks.  
 
Against this background, it is hard to see how the European Central Bank 
can have the moral authority to play a lead role in micro-prudential 
supervision. With national governments “on the hook” for the fiscal costs 
associated with financial failures, it is hard to see how they can be asked to 
give up national control of supervision. In addition, states that have adopted 
a more aggressive approach to assisting troubled financial institutions may 
wish to impose a more restrictive regulatory framework in the future. 
 
The De Larosiere report recommends that some progress be made in dealing 
with the current patchwork of financial regulatory frameworks. The report 
(and the EU Council’s recent statement) suggests that the Commission and 
the level 3 committees should work to establish a core set of financial rules, 
eliminating unnecessary diversity in areas such as definitions of regulatory 
capital and accounting practices. The report also recommends the 
establishment of “a coherent and workable regulatory framework for crisis 
management in the EU.” 
 
These recommendations are to be supported but, to my mind, they do not go 
far enough. I would rather view them as first steps towards a more 
comprehensive restructuring of financial regulation in the Euro Area. This 
restructuring would see all Eurosystem National Central Banks take over 
financial supervision. This system could then lead to a more direct role for the ECB in micro-prudential supervision. For instance, supervision of all 
financial institutions over a certain size could be required to have ECB 
involvement.  
 
In addition, I would like to see any common framework for crisis 
management go beyond the commonly-discussed issues relating to resolving 
issues relating to cross-border financial institutions to also providing explicit 
limits on the various types of financial supports (liquidity supports, asset 
support programs) that can be provided. This would fit well with a common 
central-bank-focused approach to dealing with financial crises. 
 
3. Macro-Prudential policy 
 
The EU Council has recommended setting up a European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) chaired by the President of the ECB, supported by staff from 
the ECB, and with a steering committee and board featuring chairs of the 
new European Supervisory authorities, the 27 EU Central Bank Governors 
and a representative of the European Commission. 
 
The ESRB will be charged with analysing “all the information relevant for 
identifying, monitoring and assessing potential threats and risks to financial 
stability in the EU that arise from macro-economic developments and 
developments within the financial system as a whole” and to issue risk 
warnings and recommendations on measures to deal with these risks. 
 
I agree with the suggestion to set up an ESRB and to give the ECB a central 
role in it. I worked for five years (from 2002 to 2007) as an economist at the Irish Central Bank and visited the ECB many times. The ECB’s economics 
staff is undoubtedly the finest collection of economic and financial talent in 
Europe and I have always been impressed by their work ethic and dedication 
to public service. The reports and recommendations of the ESRB will 
undoubtedly become an important input into policy formulation for central 
banks and financial supervisors throughout Europe. 
 
That said, I think the vision of the ESRB set out in the EU Council’s 
statement of 10 June 2009 and in the De Larosiere report is disappointingly 
limited and, as such, the new Board is unlikely to be as effective in 
preventing future crises as it could be. 
 
 
3.1 Previous Macro-Prudential Analysis 
 
The ESRB’s role will be to undertake macro-prudential analysis. This 
involves going beyond micro-level examinations of whether individual 
financial institutions are in good financial shape and complying with 
regulations to examining the financial system as a whole and whether the 
interconnections between its various components can lead to macro-level 
instability. 
 
It is hardly surprising that the recent financial crisis has led many to believe 
that there should be an increased focus on macro-prudential analysis and this 
is hard to disagree with. However, it would be wrong to argue that such 
analysis had not been undertaken prior to the crisis. In fact, the ECB, the 
IMF and many individual country central banks regularly produce macro-prudential analyses in the form of Financial Stability reports. As such, it is 
instructive to take a look at some of the Financial Stability reports released 
prior to the onset of the recent crisis. 
 
As a first example, consider the following statement from the overview of 
the June 2007 edition of the ECB’s Financial Stability Review
2  
 
In late February and early March 2007, against a background of rising 
delinquencies in the US sub-prime mortgage market and increasing 
uncertainty about the US macroeconomic outlook, equity prices fell, credit 
spreads widened and market volatility rose across a host of asset classes – 
including foreign exchange markets, where some carry trades were 
unwound. Improvements in the risk management practices of financial firms 
appear to have contributed to ensuring that higher financial market volatility 
did not prevent capital markets from facilitating the intermediation of 
capital. 
 
It concluded that 
 
With the euro area financial system in a generally healthy condition and the 
economic outlook remaining favourable, the most likely prospect is that 
financial system stability will be maintained in the period ahead. 
 
In other words, just two months before the global financial system began to 
fall apart---and much of the early action revolved around European banks---
the ECB’s financial stability analysts concluded that the system was in a 
                                                 
2 Available online at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview200706en.pdf healthy condition and that banks had improved their “risk management 
practices.”  These same practices are, of course, today viewed as hopelessly 
flawed. 
 
The ECB Financial Stability Review is a document prepared with the close 
involvement of the Banking Supervision Committee and is thus likely to be 
similar in style to the documents that will be produced by the ESRB. If these 
analysts could not see the last crisis coming, it is legitimate to question 
whether they will get it right the next time.   
 
The ECB team were by no means on their own. Consider the following 
statement from the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report of April 2006: 
 
There is growing recognition that the dispersion of credit risk by banks to a 
broader and more diverse group of investors, rather than warehousing such 
risk on their balance sheets, has helped make the banking and overall 
financial system more resilient. The improved resilience may be seen in 
fewer bank failures and more consistent credit provision. Consequently, the 
commercial banks may be less vulnerable today to credit or economic 
shocks. 
 
In other words, just a little more than a year before the onset of a global 
financial crisis triggered largely by securitisation and structured finance, the 
IMF’s analysts believed that these instruments made the global financial 
system less vulnerable to instability. 
 My point here is not to criticise those involved in preparing these reports or 
to argue that better analysis would have seen the full dangers associated with 
structured finance. In fact, I would argue quite the opposite. Both the ECB’s 
Financial Stability Review and the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report 
are excellent publications, full of hugely informative analysis, and the staff 
that produce them are to be commended.  
 
Rather, my point is to flag that even the smartest analysts may fail to see 
underlying sources of systemic risk before it is too late. If the highly trained 
staff of the ECB and the IMF failed to see that the world financial system 
was on the brink of extreme instability in 2007, how can we be so confident 
that they will correctly call the next major event? 
 
One possible answer is to equip the new ESRB with more resources. This is 
a good idea but it is by no means certain to produce much better outcomes. 
Unfortunately, the poor risk assessments prior to the recent crisis are not just 
random examples but illustrate the general difficulties associated with 
financial stability analysis. Most of the time, thankfully, the financial system 
is stable. As such, it is particularly difficult to examine the system at such a 
time of stability and make the correct call about a particular aspect of the 
system that is likely to trigger instability at some point in the near future. 
 
Moreover, Financial Stability practitioners are well aware that their business 
can lead them to be seen as “Boys who cry Wolf.”  The ESRB will 
undoubtedly be conscious of the damage that could be done to its reputation 
if it repeatedly issues warnings about instabilities that then don’t arise. 
 To sum up on this issue, while I welcome the establishment of the European 
Systemic Risk Board, and the ECB’s role in it, I fear that its envisaged role--
-which principally involves issuing warnings---is unlikely to help much in 
preventing future crises. In the rest of the paper I propose some additional 
measures which can be taken by European authorities, either via the ESRB 
or in addition to it. 
 
 
3.2 The ESRB and Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffers 
 
It is now widely agreed that requirements for counter-cyclical capital buffers 
should be adopted: Both the De Larosiere and Turner reports come out in 
favour of this approach. The idea behind this recommendation is that banks 
should be forced to use good times to build up capital reserves and to allow 
banks to fall back to lower levels of capital during recessions.  
 
A similar idea that is being widely discussed is dynamic provisioning: This 
sees banks set aside larger provisions for bad loans during good times than 
are warranted by prevailing rate of loan losses and to run down these 
provisions during recessions.  These suggestions are designed to prevent the 
problem of banks running into solvency problems during recessions, leading 
to credit crunches and interventions paid for by taxpayers. 
 
I recommend that beyond issuing analyses and warnings, the new ESRB 
become directly involved in achieving the implementation of counter-
cyclical capital requirements throughout the EU. This would be a 
challenging task, involving getting agreement on this point from all the relevant supervisors, establishing a harmonised methodology to estimate 
were each economy stood in relation to its business cycle and deciding the 
extent to which capital buffers should fluctuate over time. 
 
By co-ordinating the implementation of this important measure, the ESRB 
may do more to contribute to financial stability than could be achieved by 
any number of reports. 
 
4. Beyond Committees: What Else is Needed? 
 
One lesson that we can take from this and previous financial crises is that it 
is hard for regulators to design sophisticated regulatory frameworks that 
keep up with a banking industry that is constantly being transformed by 
financial innovation. Of course, many lessons have been learned about the 
risks associated with specific new products, risk management techniques and 
business models and we are clearly already on the road to a Basle 3 that will 
attempt to deal with these. 
 
However, I think there is now a strong argument for accepting that ever 
more sophisticated financial regulation is not likely to deliver improved 
financial stability, or at least that it cannot do so on its own. 
 
I recommend that the new ESRB should become a focal point for the 
discussion (and hopefully implementation) of a range of policy options 
aimed at making the financial system fundamentally more robust. Some of 
the options that I would recommend include two that have been proposed by 
Lord Turner in his superb review document of March 2009:  
1.  A Maximum Gross Leverage Ratio: One of the main reasons financial 
instabilities went undiagnosed in the recent crisis was that the Basle 
procedures allowed risky products to be classified as though they were 
safe. Thus, many institutions that ran into trouble had massively 
expanded their balance sheets and become highly leveraged, while at 
the same time maintaining their risk-weighted capital ratios. Because 
risk-weighting will never be a perfect tool, Turner recommends a 
gross maximum leverage ratio as a “backstop” to the Basle system. 
Canada, which has survived the financial crisis better than most, 
imposes a maximum leverage ratio of 20. This would have to be 
imposed in conjunction with a greater regulatory effort to minimise 
off-balance sheet activities driven by regulatory avoidance. 
 
2.  A Minimum Core Funding Ratio: Throughout the crisis, various banks 
got into trouble because of their reliance on sources of funding that 
quickly disappeared once market sentiment turned against them. 
Turner recommends a minimum limited ratio of “core funding” 
defined as deposits plus certain types of longer funding.  
 
Three other potential suggestions that I would put forward for consideration 
are: 
 
1.  Limits on Credit Growth: Setting limits on how fast individual firms 
can expand their credit, with limits getting smaller as banks increase 
in size, is one way to limit the problems associated with irresponsible 
lending that may not be caught by supervisors.  
2.  Increasing Capital Requirements with Size: The too-big-to-fail 
problem is a difficult one to deal with directly but we can at least 
establish that large institutions (which are more likely to end up being 
rescued by the state if they fail) be required to hold higher capital 
levels. 
 
3.  Credit Concentration Rules: Basle 2 requires that, as part of the Pillar 
2 supervisory process, supervisors assess whether banks have excess 
concentrations in particular areas, leading to large amounts of highly 
correlated risks. Example such as the huge exposure to property 
lending of the Irish banks, which then needed to be rescued by the 
Irish government, show that it may be helpful to outline specific 
quantitative rules in this area. 
 
Perhaps some of these suggestions have a bit too much of the 
“sledgehammer” about them. However, they all seem to be worth discussing 
and potentially implementing in some form. Without a body such as the 
European Systemic Risk Board to analyse these proposals and then get them 
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